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TORT LAW-Comparative Fault Eliminates the Need for
Indemnification Between Concurrent Tortfeasors: Otero v.
Jordan Restaurant Enterprises
I. INTRODUCTION
In Otero v. Jordan RestaurantEnterprises,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
addressed whether an independent contractor hired by a landowner should be allowed
to reduce his liability to an injured plaintiff by comparing the fault of a concurrent
tortfeasor.2 The Otero court affirmed the trial court's refusal of a jury instruction on
comparative fault when the independent contractor hired by the landowner made a
"tacit representation" that he was properly licensed to the concurrent tortfeasor, the
City of Albuquerque. Contrary to one line of New Mexico precedent, the New
Mexico Supreme Court concluded that the defendant landowner was vicariously
liable to the plaintiff, an invitee, for the injury that resulted from the unsafe condition
on the defendant landowner's premises.4 The unsafe condition was created by the
conduct of an independent contractor hired by the landowner. Furthermore, the
supreme court held that the defendant landowner, in determining its liability to the
plaintiff, was barred from comparing the fault of a negligent concurrent tortfeasor.5
However, the court also found that the landowner was not liable to indemnify the
concurrent tortfeasor for the independent contractor's intentionally tortious conduct.6
The Otero decision may allow plaintiffs to avoid comparing the fault of immune
or insolvent concurrent tortfeasors and thus recover one hundred percent of their
damages from their chosen defendant. Moreover, after Otero, defendants may be able
to avoid indemnifying concurrent tortfeasors and to seek indemnification from
individuals for whom they are held vicariously liable. Thus, it appears that Otero
broadens vicarious liability for an intentional tortfeasor beyond the case's narrow
holding. Conversely, Otero seems to narrow the possibility that a landowner will be
held directly and strictly7 liable for failing to take precautions against unsafe
conditions on her premises.
This Note first presents the contextual background of pure comparative
negligence, several liability, vicarious liability, and proportional indemnification in
New Mexico. It then analyzes the reasoning of the supreme court in Otero. It

1.

122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996).

2. See id. at 192, 922 P.2d at 574. This Note discusses concurrent tortfeasors. For a discussion of successive
tortfeasors, see Brady Pofahl, Original and Successive Torfeasors and Release Documents in New Mexico Tort Law:
Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corporation, 27 N.M. L. REv. 697 (1997); see also.Otero, 122 N.M. at 191 n.5,
922 P.2d at 573 n.5 (discussing Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Corp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995),
and the successive tortfeasor situation).
3. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 188, 922 P.2d at. 570
4. See id. at 193, 922 P.2d at 575 ("[The defendant] has a landowner's duty that imposes vicarious liability
to invitees injured by an unsafe condition on the premises.")
5. See id. at 191, 922 P.2d at 573 (The defendant, as the owner of unsafe premises, was vicariously
responsible to the plaintiff.).
6. See id. (The defendant landowner did not stand in its independent contractor's shoes for the purpose of
determining liability to indemnify the City of Albuquerque (City), a concurrent negligent tortfeasor).
7. See Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 391, 827 P.2d 102, 106 (1992) (holding the defendant directly
responsible, under strict liability, for injuries caused by the absence of precautions in the face of peculiar risks of
harm).
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concludes by discussing the implications of the Otero decision on New Mexico tort
law.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Jordan Restaurant Enterprises (Jordan) operated a sports bar and grill in
Albuquerque, New Mexico.' In July 1989, Jordan entered into a contract with Gary
Marquart (Marquart), an independent contractor, to make improvements to Jordan's
sports bar. 9 Marquart was responsible for all architectural services, construction
services, and design services for the Jordan expansion project.' The improvements
included the installation of bleachers to be used by Jordan's patrons while watching
sporting events on a big screen television." Marquart hired an independent architect
to draw the bleacher design.'
"After the bleachers had been installed, employees of Jordan [used] the bleachers
and observed no structural weaknesses."' 3 Nevertheless, approximately four months
after the improvements were completed, the bleachers collapsed. 4 When the
bleachers collapsed, a patron of Jordan's, John Otero (Otero), fell and injured his
back. 5 Evidence later disclosed that the project architect had failed to provide
specifications for the bleachers. 6 In addition, the City of Albuquerque (City) had
issued the building permit to Marquart even though he was not properly licensed to
perform renovations on commercial premises."
Otero sued Jordan and Marquart for the personal injuries that he suffered.' 8 He
filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.' 9 The district
court granted Otero's motion for partial summary judgment and held Jordan and
8. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 188, 922 P.2d at 570.
9. See id.
10. See Defendant's Brief in Chief at 2, Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569
(1996) (No. 22-841).
11. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 188-89, 922 P.2d at 570-71.
12. See Defendant's Brief at 4, Otero (No. 22-841) (The plans were prepared and stamped by an architect
retained by Marquart.).
13. Otero, 122 N.M. at 189, 922 P.2d at 571.
14. See Defendant's Brief at 4, Otero (No. 22-841); see also Otero, 122 N.M. at 189, 922 P.2d at 571.
Defendant Jordan conceded that the bleachers were negligently installed by Marquart. See Defendant's Brief at 3,
Otero (No. 22-841); see also Otero, 122 N.M. at 189, 922 P.2d at 571. The metal supports on the bleachers were
fastened in a vertical position despite the fact that the manufacturer's assembly instructions called for metal crossbracing to be installed in a "X" fashion. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 189, 922 P.2d at 571.
15. Otero was seated on the top row of the bleacher assembly and fell, along with twenty-five other spectators
who had purchased a ticket to view a closed circuit showing of a boxing match. See Appellee's Answer Brief in Chief
at 1, Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996) (No. 15-232).
16. The architect noted the location of the bleachers on the plans, but failed to set out any direction,
specifications, or special requirements on the plans. See Defendant's Brief at 4, Otero (No. 22-841).
17. The City's permit department usually checks a contractor's license when a contractor applies for a building
permit. In this particular instance, the building permit was issued by the City for the construction project without
ascertaining whether Marquart was properly licensed. See id.
18. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 188, 922 P.2d at 570; Judgment of July 15, 1992 at 1,Otero v. Jordan, 122 N.M.
187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996) (No. CV-90-1949); see also infra note 19.
19. See Judgment of July 15, 1992 at 2, Otero (No. CV-90-1949). After the Judgment of July 15, 1992,
defendant Marquart no longer was a party in the action nor in the appeal to the supreme court. See generally Otero,
122 N.M. at 188, 922 P.2d at 570. Marquart did not appear at the hearing for Jordan's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on Liability against Jordan and Marquart, see Judgment of July 15, 1992, at 2,Otero (No. CV-90-1949),
and did not appeal the Order granting partial summary judgment on liability and the Verdict imposing liability, as a
matter of law, on Jordan for Marquart's acts, see Defendant's Brief in Chief at 1, Otero (No. 22-841).
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Marquart jointly and severally liable, 2 basing its decision on Broome v. Byrd, 21 a
New Mexico Court of Appeals' decision.' When the issue of damages was presented
to the jury, Jordan requested that the district court allow the jury to compare
Marquart' s fault with that of the architect and the City.' The district court refused
the requested jury instruction? 4 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Otero for
$47,000 against defendants Jordan and Marquart jointly and severally. 25
Jordan appealed the verdict, arguing that the district court had erroneously entered
summary judgment on the issue of Jordan's liability for Marquart's acts. 26 Jordan also
argued that the court erred by not instructing the jury on comparative fault.' On
review, the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted section 422(b) of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts.' It found Jordan liable to Otero to the same extent that Marquart
and the architect would have been liable.29 Additionally, the court of appeals held
that it was not error to refuse Jordan's requested instruction requiring the jury to
compare the fault of the City for the purpose of reducing the liability of Jordan.' The
court of appeals concluded that, if Otero had sued the City, the City would have been
3
entitled to indemnification from Jordan for any damage award against it. 1 It reasoned

that Jordan's liability arose from Jordan's failure to take reasonable precautions to
protect Otero from the risk of harm.32 Thus, the court of appeals held Jordan directly
liable for any risk of harm caused by Marquart.33

20. See Judgment of July 15, 1992 at 2, Otero (No. CV-90-1949).
21. 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1991).
22. See Judgment of July 15, 1992 at 2, Otero (No. CV-90-1949); see also Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters.,
119 N.M. 721,722, 895 P.2d 243, 244 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996).

23. Jordan argued that the jury should be allowed to consider the negligence of all of the participants whose
acts or conduct led to Otero's injuries. See Appellant's Brief in Chief at 12, Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119
N.M. 721, 895 P.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1995) (No. 22-841).
24. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 189, 922 P.2d at 571.
25. See id.; see also Judgment of July 15, 1992 at 3, Otero (No. CV-90-1949).

26. See Appellant's Brief at 6, Otero (No. 15-232).
27. See id. at 12.

28. Section 422 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS states in part:
A possessor of land who entrusts to an independent contractor construction, repair, or other work
on the land, or on a building or other structure upon it, is subject to the same liability as though
he had retained the work in his own hands to others on or outside of the land for physical harm

caused to them by the unsafe condition of the structure
(b) after he has resumed possession of the land upon its completion.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422 (1965).
In Broome v. Byrd, the court of appeals adopted section 422(a) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, holding

that a commercial building owner can be vicariously liable for its independent contractor's negligence "where the
negligence created a dangerous condition causing injury to a business visitor in those areas of the building over which
the owner retained control." Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 721, 723, 895 P.2d 243, 245 (Ct. App.
1995) (citing Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 41, 822 P.2d 677, 680 (Ct. App. 1991)), rev'don other grounds, 122

N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996).
29. See Otero, 119 N.M. at 723-25, 895 P.2d at 245-47. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS holds a
possessor of land to the same liability as a hired contractor-as if the landowner had retained the work in his own
hands "after he has resumed possession of the land upon its completion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422(b)

(1965).
30. See Otero, 119 N.M. at 725, 895 P.2d at 247.
3 1. See id. at 726, 895 P.2d at 248.
32. See id. at 725, 895 P.2d at 247.
33. See id. (Jordan had a nondelegable duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the bleachers were in
a safe condition for visitors such as Otero).
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The New Mexico Supreme Court initially denied certiorari' and Jordan filed a
Motion for Reconsideration.35 Jordan argued in its Motion that the court of appeals'
reference in Otero to a footnote in the supreme court's Amrep Southwest, Inc. v.
ShollenbargerWood Treating, Inc. 36 opinion did not cite New Mexico authority.37
Jordan further argued that the court of appeals reliance on that footnote was in
conflict with the supreme court's statement that "'[it had] already created a system
in which each concurrent tortfeasor is liable only for the percentage of damages that
is attributable to his or her fault.' "38
The New Mexico Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari for the limited
purpose of considering whether the City would have been entitled to indemnification
from Jordan and if so, the effect it would have on comparative fault. 39 The supreme
court overruled the court of appeals' holding that the City was entitled to
indemnification from Jordan.' Nonetheless, the supreme
41 court affirmed the trial
court's denial of a jury instruction on comparative fault.
III.

HISTORICAL AND CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

A.

The Adoption of the Pure Comparative Negligence Doctrine
In Scott v. Rizzo, 42 the New Mexico Supreme Court replaced the long adhered-to
rule of contributory negligence 43 by judicially adopting the doctrine of pure
comparative negligence." Comparative negligence replaced the "all-or-nothing"
standard of contributory negligence.45 The judicial adoption of comparative
negligence eliminated the inequity and injustice found under the previous doctrine
of contributory negligence where the entire loss was cast upon a plaintiff whose own
negligence contributed to his injury.' The court noted that liability based on fault is

34. See Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 617, 894 P.2d 394 (1995).
35. See generally Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant-Appellant Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Otero
v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 810, 896 P.2d 490 (May 25, 1995) (No. 22-841).
36. 119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995).
37. See Motion for Reconsideration of Defendant-Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 119 N.M.
810, 896 P.2d 490 (May 25, 1995) (No. 22-841) (citing Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 721, 726, 895
P.2d 243, 248 (Ct. App. 1995)).
38. See id. (quoting Amrep, 119 N.M. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448).
39. See Otero, 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996).
40. See id. at 193, 922 P.2d at 575.
41. See id.
42. 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981). The supreme court consolidated Scott with Claymore v. City of
Albuquerque, affd sub nom., Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981), and adopted the court of appeals'
Claymore opinion. See Scott, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234; see also Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.,
98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
43. The supreme court recognized that the adoption of comparative negligence "mark[ed] a significant change
in the law of negligence," but felt that the adoption would "improve the administration of justice." Scott, 96 N.M. at
683, 634 P.2d at 1235. The court further stated "that long-term adherence to [the] rule [of contributory negligence
did] not, by itself, justify its continuance if justice demand[ed] its abolition." Id.
44. See id. at 684,634 P.2d at 1236. In finding "that the 'pure' form [of comparative negligence] is superior
and preferable to other comparative systems," the supreme court in Scott followed the United States Supreme Court.
Id. at 689, 634 P.2d at 1241 (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., Inc., 421 U.S. 397 (1975)).
45. See id.
46. See id.

Summer 1997]

OTERO V. JORDAN RESTAURANT ENTERPRISES

the cornerstone of tort law.47 Furthermore, a system such as contributory negligence
does not serve any4principle of fault liability because it permits some wrongdoers to
avoid all liability.
Under pure comparative negligence, the plaintiff's percentage of contributing fault
will reduce the recovery of total damages in an amount equal to her degree of fault,
while at the same time exposing the defendant to liability as a result of her own
fault.49 The Scott court noted that the pure form of comparative negligence has three
benefits: (1) it denies recovery for one's fault; (2) it permits recovery to the extent of
another's fault; and (3) it holds parties responsible to the degree that they have
caused harm. 50 Thus, as a general rule, New Mexico applies the pure comparative
negligence doctrine to concurrent tortfeasors and holds each party severally liable for
their percentage of attributable fault.
However, there are some circumstances where New Mexico bars the application
of the pure comparative negligence doctrine. For example, intentional misconduct
bars the application of the pure comparative negligence doctrine. This is because
intentional tortfeasors, as a matter of law, are jointly and severally liable for the harm
they have caused rather than severally liable for a percentage of attributable fault.5 '
In Sauter v. St. Michael's College, 2 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
fraudulent tortfeasors would not be allowed, by operation of law, to profit from their
own fraud.53 The Sauter court based its decision to deny one guilty of fraud the
opportunity to profit from that wrong on fundamental principles of equity.'
Additionally, the New Mexico Supreme Court held in Gouveia v. CiticorpPerson
to Person FinancialCenter, Inc.55 that, under some circumstances, the mere failure
to disclose facts may be a fraudulent misrepresentation. 6
Most recently, in Reichert v. Atler,57 the New Mexico Supreme Court ruled that
a party who commits an intentional tort should not be entitled to escape full

47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. The pure form of comparative fault requires wrongdoers to share the costs at a ratio of their
respective wrongdoing and more fairly apportions the burden of fault than the modified system of comparative fault.
See id. This is because the modified comparative fault system allows a 49% negligent plaintiff to recover 51% of his
damages, but denies any recovery to a plaintiff who is found to be at least 50% negligent. See id.
50. See id. ("The pure form will not permit unjust enrichment of either party.").
51. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(1) (Repl. Pamp. 1996) (New Mexico Several Liability Act). Section
41-3A-I(C) reads in part:
The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(I) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage ....
Id.
52. 70 N.M. 380, 374 P.2d 134 (1962).
53. See iat at 388-89, 374 P.2d at 140-41. As the Sauter court stated: "(lit is a fundamental principle of equity
that no one can take advantage of [their] own wrong." Id. at 388, 374 P.2d at 140 (citing Honk v. Karlsson, 292 P.2d
455 (Ariz. 1956)).
54. See id. at 389, 374 P.2d at 140; see also Cruise v. Graham, 622 So.2d 37, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
(denial of comparative fault instruction in fraud action not error); Tratchel v. Essex Group Inc., 452 N.W.2d 171, 18081 (Iowa 1990) (instruction on comparative fault properly denied to defendant guilty of fraud); Neff v. Bud Lewis
Co., 89 N.M. 145, 149, 548 P.2d 107, 111 (Ct. App. 1976) (the doctrine of negligent misrepresentation does not
afford a defense of contributory negligence); Estate of Braswell v. People's Credit Union, 602 A.2d 510, 512-14, 515
(R.I. 1992) (comparative negligence principles are inapplicable in action for negligent misrepresentation).
55. 101 N.M. 572, 686 P.2d 262 (1984).
56. See id. at 576, 686 P.2d at 266.
57. 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
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responsibility by comparing his intentional wrongdoing with that of a negligent
concurrent tortfeasor.58 As a result, New Mexico denies application of the pure
comparative negligence doctrine when a defendant is guilty of the intentional failure
to disclose certain facts or the intentional tort of fraud. 9 Thus, the mere failure to
disclose certain facts may bar a jury instruction on comparative negligence in New
Mexico.
Liability of ConcurrentTortfeasors in New Mexico
New Mexico has followed the general rule of holding concurrent tortfeasors
severally liable, retaining only four limited exceptions when joint and several liability
may apply. The doctrine of several liability was judicially adopted in Bartlett v. New
Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.' Shortly thereafter, the New Mexico Legislature
adopted the doctrine of several liability with statutorily retained exceptions.6
B.

1. The Adoption of Several Liability as the General Rule in New Mexico
Prior to the adoption of pure comparative negligence in Scott v. Rizzo, 62 New

Mexico followed the common law rule of joint and several liability. 63 In Bartlett,the
New Mexico Court of Appeals abolished joint and several liability under New
Mexico's pure comparative negligence system.' The Bartlett court addressed
whether the defendant in the case at bar could be held liable for the entire damage
caused by the negligence of the defendant and the negligence of an unknown
concurrent tortfeasor in an automobile accident.6 Under the common law rule of
joint and several liability, either defendant in the automobile accident could have
been held one hundred percent liable for the damage caused by the defendants'
combined negligence.6 6 The specific issue in Bartlettwas whether a defendant who

58. See id. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381. The Reichertcourt stated that public policy supports allowing a negligent
bar owner to reduce his liability by the percentage of fault attributable to the intentional shooting of an off-duty
employee by a patron on the premises. See id. The Reichertcourt further stated that such an analysis was consistent
with the adoption of comparative fault in Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,634 P.2d 1234 (1981), and the rejection ofjoint
and several liability in comparative fault in Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579
(Ct. App. 1982). See Reichert, 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381.
59. See Reichert, 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379; Sauter, 70 N.M. 380, 374 P.2d 134. New Mexico is not the
only state to deny comparative fault jury instructions when the defendant is guilty of fraud. See, e.g., Cruise, 622
So.2d at 40 (Florida); Tratchel, 452 N.w.2d at 180-81 (Iowa).
60. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
61. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1996). Section 41-3A-1 reads in part:
A. In any cause of action to which the doctrine of comparative fault applies, the doctrine
imposing joint and several liability upon two or more wrongdoers whose conduct proximately
caused an injury to any plaintiff is abolished except as otherwise provided hereafter.
Id.; see Andrew G. Schultz & M.E. Occhialino, Statutory Adoption of Several Liability in New Mexico: A
Commentary and Quasi-LegislativeHistory, 18 N.M. L. REv. 483 (1988). For the description of the four statutory
exceptions to several liability, see infra note 74.
62. 96 N.M. 682, 683, 634 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1981).
63. See Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 154, 646 P.2d at 581.
64. See id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585. The Bartlett court abolished joint and several liability for negligent
concurrent tortfeasors based on fundamental notions of fairness. See id. at 158-59, 646 P.2d at 585-86.
65. See id.
66. See id.
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was only thirty percent at fault, while another tortfeasor was seventy percent at fault,
still would be held responsible for paying one hundred percent of the damages.67
In Bartlett, the New Mexico Court of Appeals refused to retain joint and several
liability under New Mexico's pure comparative negligence system.6 8 The Bartlett
court, relying on Scott v. Rizzo, reasoned that "[t]he concept of one indivisible wrong,
based on common law technicalities, [was] obsolete, and [was] not to be applied in
comparative negligence cases ....",69 The Bartlett court refused to impose full
liability on all defendants through joint and several liability simply to protect a
plaintiff from an unknown or insolvent concurrent tortfeasor.7 ° Thus, under Bartlett,
the plaintiff bears the risk of an immune or insolvent concurrent tortfeasor.7' In
abolishing joint and several liability for concurrent tortfeasors, the Bartlett court
established that the liability of a defendant would be predicated upon relative
blameworthiness rather than the unavailability or insolvency of concurrent
tortfeasors.7 2
2. Exceptions to the General Rule of Several Liability
After Bartlett, as previously indicated, the New Mexico Legislature adopted the
doctrine of several liability for concurrent tortfeasors with four statutorily retained
exceptions. 73 The legislature recognized the continued application of joint and several
liability to: (1) persons acting with intent to harm; (2) persons found vicariously
liable for the acts of another; (3) persons found strictly liable for a defective product;
or (4) situations having a sound basis in public policy. 74 Thus, although several
liability is the general rule in New Mexico for concurrent tortfeasors, joint and
several liability continues to apply in certain limited circumstances.

67. See id.
at 153, 646 P.2d at 580.
68. See id.
at 158, 646 P.2d at 585. But cf.Arctic Structures, Inc. v. Wedmore, 605 P.2d 426 (Alaska 1979)
(retaining joint and several liability for concurrent tortfeasors); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 578
P.2d 899 (Cal. 1978) (retaining joint and several liability in order to allow an injured plaintiff to collect damages
awarded); Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So.2d 386 (Fla. 1975) (the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors Act
retains full joint and several liability); Weeks v. Felter, 297 N.W.2d 678 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (doctrine of
comparative negligence does not mandate abandonment of joint and several liability).
69. Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585 (citing Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981)); see
Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
70. See Bartlett, 98 N.M. at 158-59, 646 P.2d at 585-86.
71. See id.
72. See id.
Under the doctrine of comparative negligence damages are to be apportioned on the basis of fault.
As a result, the Bartlett court reasoned that liability also must be apportioned on the basis of fault. See id.
at 159, 646
P.2d at 586. Several liability also enables concurrent tortfeasors to pay for the damages that they have caused, rather
than being held 100 percent liable for the damages under joint and several liability. See id.
73. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1996).
74. See id. Section 41-3A-1(C) provides in pertinent part:
The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(1) to any person or persons who acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage;
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person vicariously liable
for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed to those
persons;
(3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective product, but only
to that portion of the total liability attributed to those persons; or
(4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing and having sound basis in public policy.
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a. The Doctrine of Vicarious Liability in New Mexico
The general principle of liability for an employer/landowner is that an employer
is not liable for the negligence of a hired contractor.75 However, this rule is subject
to numerous exceptions.76 Indeed, the exceptions are so numerous that the general
rule seems unlikely to be applied in most cases." With the New Mexico Several
Liability Act, New Mexico legislatively has applied joint and several liability to
vicarious liability cases.78 Thus, one who employs an independent contractor to
perform work which creates a particular risk of harm to others is subject to vicarious
liability for failure to exercise reasonable care, unless special precautions are taken.79
Hence, a employer/landowner may be held liable for the negligent failure of a
contractor to put structures on the property in a reasonably safe condition.8"
In Broome v. Byrd,8 the New Mexico Court of Appeals adopted section 422(a)
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts8 2 and held the defendant landowner vicariously
liable for his independent contractor's negligence.83 Section 422(a) pertains to the
liability of the landowner for harm caused by his independent contractor's negligence
while the work is in progress.M The Broome court found no basis for allowing a
commercial building owner to avoid the duty to safely maintain his premises for
business visitors merely because he chose to hire an independent contractor to
perform the construction work for him.85 Thus, the Broome Court held the landowner

75. See Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 721,723, 895 P.2d 243, 245 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing
Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38, 39, 822 P.2d 677,678 (Ct. App. 1991)), rev'd on other grounds, 122 N.M. 187, 922
P.2d 569 (1996); Saiz v. Belen School District, 113 N.M. 387, 393, 827 P.2d 102, 108 (1992); Budagher v. Anrep
Corp., 97 N.M. 116, 119,637 P.2d 547, 550 (1981) (citing Srader v. Pecos Constr. Co., 71 N.M. 320, 378 P.2d 364
(1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429 (1965)).
76. See Otero, 119 N.M. at 723, 895 P.2d at 245; Budagher,97 N.M. at 1i9-21, 637 P.2d at 550-52 (citing
Srader, 71 N.M. 320, 378 P.2d 364; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429).
77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt. b.

78. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(2). Section 41-3A-1(C) provides in part:
The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:...
(2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would make one person vicariously liable
for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of total liability attributed to those persons.
Id. § 41-3A-I(C).
79. See Budagher, 97 N.M. at 119-20, 637 P.2d at 550-51. (The Budagher court did not explicitly state what
type of liability a landowner has for the negligence of an independent contractor-i.e., whether it is direct or vicarious
liability.)
80. See id. at 120, 637 P.2d at 551 (Landowners who hire independent contractors are liable for inherently
dangerous conditions created upon their land.).
81. 113 N.M. 38, 822 P.2d 677 (Ct. App. 1991).
82. See id. at 41, 822 P.2d at 680; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422(a) (1965) (entitled "Work
on Buildings and Other Structures on Land"). Section 422 states:
A possessor of land who entrusts to an independent contractor construction, repair, or other work
on the land, or on a building or other structure upon it, is subject to the same liability as though
he had retained the work in his own hands to others on or outside of the land for physical harm
caused to them by the unsafe condition of the structure
(a) while the possessor has retained possession of the land during the progress of the work.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422.

83. See Broome, 113 N.M. at 41,822 P.2d at 680. The commercial landowner's hired painter left a drop cloth
on the floor which caused an employee of the landowner's tenant to trip and fall as she was leaving work. See id. at
39, 822 P.2d at 678.
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422(a).

85. See Broome, 113 N.M. at 41, 822 P.2d at 680.
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liable for the unsafe condition created by the independent contractor during the
construction as though the landowner had himself defectively performed the work.86
b. The Public Policy Exception to Several Liability.
The New Mexico Legislature adopted a public policy exception to several liability
in section 41-3A-1(C)(4) of the New Mexico Several Liability Act.87 The New
Mexico Supreme Court first construed the above public policy exception in Saiz v.
Belen School District.88 In Saiz, the court specifically addressed "whether a
[landowner's] nondelegable duty gives rise to direct strict liability [on the part of the
landowner] for the absence of required precautions or whether [the landowner's
nondelegable duty only] gives rise to vicarious liability [on the part of the landowner]
for the negligence of the independent contractor." 89 The Saiz court held that the
landowner in the case before it was directly and strictly liable for failing to take
reasonable precautions to protect against a negligently constructed and maintained
high voltage lighting system.90 For its holding, the Saiz court relied on Pendergrass
v. Lovelace9' and Budagher v. Amrep Corp.,92 both which indicated that an employer
has a nondelegable duty to ensure that precautions are taken.93 The Saiz court made
no mention of Broome v. Byrd in its decision.
In Saiz, the test of liability was "the presence or absence of precautions that would
be deemed reasonably necessary by one to whom knowledge of all circumstances is
attributed." 94 Under Saiz, New Mexico holds landowners jointly and severally liable
under the statutory public policy exception to several liability. As such, under Saiz,
landowners are directly and strictly liable for their independent contractor's
negligence when an inherent risk of harm is involved and the landowner has failed
to take reasonable precautions to protect against such harm. 95

86. See id.
87. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(4). Section 41-3A-1(C) provides in part:
The doctrine imposing joint and several liability shall apply:
(4) to situations... having a sound basis in public policy.
Id. § 41-3A-1(C).

88. 113 N.M. 387, 400, 827 P.2d 102, 115 (1992). "This [c]ourt has not had occasion to add to the express
exceptions of the [several liability s]tatute under the public policy grounds of [s]ubsection [41-3A-1](C)(4). We do
so today." Id. at 400, 827 P.2d at 115.
89. Id. at 394, 827 P.2d at 109.
90. SeeSaiz, 113 N.M. 387, 827 P.2d 102.
91. 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953) (holding that work that is intrinsically and inherently dangerous in
performance is not delegable to escape liability).
92. 97 N.M. 116, 637 P.2d 547 (1981) (referring to several exceptions to the general rule of non-liability,
including "peculiar risk" and "special danger").
93. See Saiz, 113 N.M. at 394-95, 827 P.2d at 109-10 (citing Budagher, 97 N.M. at 119-20, 637 P.2d at 55051; Pendergrass,57 N.M. at 663, 262 P.2d at 232).
94. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110.
95. See id. The phrase "reasonable precaution" could include maintaining a public walkway in such a
condition so that it does not become slick. See generally Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs, 118 N.M. 134, 879 P.2d
766(1994).

NEW MEXICO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 27

The Adoption of ProportionalIndemnification and Extension of Equitable
Principlesin New Mexico
New Mexico adopted proportional indemnification in Amrep Southwest, Inc. v.
Shollenbarger Wood Treating, Inc.96 The Amrep court found that the equitable
principles underlying New Mexico's adoption of comparative negligence mandated
a right of proportional indemnity for defendants who could not raise the fault of
97
concurrent tortfeasors as a defense because of the plaintiff s choice of remedy. It
therefore adopted proportional indemnification in order to establish an equitable
system in which a defendant who is held fully liable may seek partial recovery from
others who also are at fault. 98
The Amrep court cautioned, however, that proportional indemnification applies
in only limited circumstances. 99 Proportional indemnification does not apply when
the factfinder makes a determination of liability under the doctrines of pure
comparative negligence and several liability."° The court further warned that
proportional indemnification applies only when contribution or some other form of
proration of fault among tortfeasors is unavailable. 01
C.

IV. RATIONALE OF THE OTERO COURT
In Otero, the New Mexico Supreme Court did not address the New Mexico Court
of Appeals' adoption in Otero of section 422(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 0 2 even though, with its adoption of section 422(b), the court of appeals
expanded its earlier decision in Broome.0 3 The court of appeals in Otero held the
defendant landowner, Jordan, liable for harm occurring after the completion of the
work by its independent contractor under section 422(b) to the same extent as if it
had "[it]self defectively performed the work."0 4 Under the court of appeals' analysis
in Otero, if the City, a concurrent negligent tortfeasor, was found to have been liable
in any way to Otero, Jordan would have been required to indemnify the City because

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
regarding

119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995).
See id. at 552-54, 893 P.2d 448-50.
See id. at 552, 893 P.2d at 448.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 552-53, 893 P.2d at 448-49.
See Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 122 N.M. 187, 188, 922 P.2d 569, 570 (1996) ("Questions
the adoption of [s]ection 422(b) [of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS] ...are not before this

[c]ourt.").
103. See Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 721, 723, 895 P.2d 243, 245 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd on
other grounds, 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569, (1996); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 422(b) (1965).
Section 422 states in part:
A possessor of land who entrusts to an independent contractor construction, repair, or other work
on the land, or on a building or other structure upon it, is subject to the same liability as though
he had retained the work in his own hands to others on or outside of the land for physical harm
caused to them by the unsafe condition of the structure
(b) after he has resumed possession of the land upon its completion.

Id. § 422.
104. See Otero, 119 N.M. at 724, 895 P.2d at 246.
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Marquart,
for whom Jordan was vicariously liable, would have had to indemnify the
10 5
City.

However, as previously noted, the supreme court in Otero limited its review to
whether the City would have been entitled to indemnification from Jordan for any
liability imposed on the City, and any effect that would have on comparative fault.'16
The supreme court narrowed the scope of its review in order to clarify that
proportional indemnification does not apply when a plaintiff's theory provides a
ready mechanism by which to apportion liability under the doctrine of comparative
negligence." 7 Nonetheless, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's refusal of the
proposed jury instruction which would have authorized the jury to compare the fault
of the City to that of Marquart and reduce Jordan's vicarious liability for Marquart's
tortious conduct.0 8
The supreme court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that Jordan's failure
to discover the defect in the bleachers was active negligence"'° because it was
Marquart who failed to correctly assemble the bleachers. ° The court found that
because Jordan was not an active tortfeasor, it only was vicariously liable to Otero
for Marquart's negligence.'l1 As a result, Jordan did not stand in Marquart's shoes
for the purposes of determining liability to the City for indemnification. 12 The
supreme court concluded that proportional indemnification was not warranted and
that the court of appeals' reliance on Amrep Southwest, Inc. v. ShollenbargerWood
Treating, Inc.," for that proposition was misplaced."'

105. See id. at 725-26, 895 P.2d at 247-48.
106. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 188, 922 P.2d at 570.
107. See id at 190-91, 922 P.2d at 572-73. Otero sued in tort. Thus, his "theory of the case provide[d] a ready
mechanism by which to fairly apportion liability for damages among all those at fault under the doctrine of
comparative negligence." Id. As such, the court of appeals' conclusion that the City had a right to proportional
indemnification from Otero was incorrect. See id.
108. See id. at 192, 922 P.2d at 574. According to the supreme court, it would have been contrary to public
policy for it to allow Marquart to reduce his liability to Otero and profit from his "tacit representation" to the City that
he did have a valid license when he knew that he did not. See id. at 192-93, 922 P.2d at 574-75.
109. See id. at 191,922 P.2d at 573. The supreme court stated that the court of appeals was incorrect in making
"[any suggestion that the liability of a landowner to a business invitee for an unsafe condition created by [the
landowner's independent] contractor and not discovered by the landowner arises by active negligence." Id.
110. See id. "Marquart's negligence in failing to correctly assemble the bleachers caused Otero's damages.
...Jordan did not discover that the bleachers were unsafe. Hence, Jordan's liability [did] not arise from its active
negligence, and[, thus, Jordan was] not.. . liable to indemnify concurrent tortfeasors[, such as the City]." Id. at 19192, 922 P.2d at 573-74.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 193,922P.2dat575.
113. 119 N.M. 542, 893 P.2d 438 (1995).
114. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 189-91, 922 P.2d at 571-73 (discussing Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119
N.M. 721, 725-26, 895 P.2d 243, 247-48 (Ct. App. 1995), rev'd, 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996)). The court
of appeals followed the analysis stemming from its adoption in Otero of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
section 422(b) (1965). See Otero, 119 N.M. at 723-27, 895 P.2d at 245-49. The court of appeals analysis was as
follows:
(1) [Jordan was] liable for the defective bleachers to the same extent as the independent
contractor[, Marquart,] would be liable; (2) under the circumstances of this case, the independent
contractor[, Marquart,] and, therefore, [the d]efendant[, Jordan,] would be required to indemnify
the City in the event the City were [sic] found to be liable at all to [the p]laintiff[, Otero]; and (3)
therefore, [the p]laintiff should not be required to bring an action against the City, if [the p]laintiff
elects instead to proceed directly against [the d]efendant for his damages.
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In Otero, the supreme court stated that a landowner's liability for an unsafe
condition on her premises does not arise from the landowner's active negligence
when the condition is created by a contractor and not discovered by the landowner,' 1 5
e.g., a latent defect. The supreme court found the defendant landowner, Jordan, to be
vicariously responsible, rather than directly and strictly liable, to the plaintiff, Otero,
for the unsafe condition on Jordan's premises created by the negligence of Marquart,
the independent contractor hired by Jordan. 1 6 Jordan was vicariously liable to Otero
because he "stood in the shoes" of Marquart for the purpose of determining liability
to Otero."7 However, the Otero court held that Jordan was not liable to indemnify
8
concurrent tortfeasors, such as the City, because Jordan was not actively negligent,"
and because "Jordan ha[d] no duty to the City" arising from Marquart's fraudulent
permit application" 9-hence, Jordan did not "stand in the shoes" of Marquart for the
purposes of determining liability to the City for indemnification. As a result, Jordan
2
would not have been liable to indemnify the City had Otero chosen to sue the City."
V.
A.

ANALYSIS OF OTERO

Differing Standardsof Liaibility

In 1991, the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Broome v. Byrd held that a
commercial landowner can be "vicariously liable for an independent contractor's
negligence while the work is in progress and where the negligence created a
dangerous condition causing injury to a business visitor in those areas of the building
over which the [land]owner retains control.'' In 1992, the New Mexico Supreme
Court held in Saiz v. Belen School Districtthat a landowner's nondelegable duty to
ensure that reasonable precautions were taken to protect against physical harm to
others gave rise to joint and several liability that was direct-not vicarious. As a

115. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 191, 922 P.2d at 573.
Any suggestion that the liability of the [defendant] landowner to the plaintiff [under the
circumstances at bar arose] from the active negligence of the landowner is incorrect ....Jordan's
liability to Otero [arose] by operation of law because of a policy-based decision that landowners
should be held responsible for unsafe conditions on their premises whether or not they directly
created them.
Id.
116. "Jordan, as the owner of unsafe premises, [was] vicariously responsible to Otero for the entire liability
of the independent contractor, Marquart." Id. at 192,922 P.2d at 574. But cf Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387,
827 P.2d 102 (1992) (where liability of the landowner for failure to take reasonable precautions gave rise to joint and
several liability under the section 41-3A-I(C)(4) public policy exception in New Mexico's Several Liability Act,
rather than vicarious liability under the section 41-3A-1-(C)(2) exception to several liability in the Act). The supreme
court's decision, while contrary to its earlier decision in Saiz, was in line with the court of appeals' earlier decision
in Broome. See discussion infra Part V.
117. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 192-93, 922 P.2d at 574-75.
118. See id. at 191-92, 922 P.2d at 573-74.
119. Id. at 192, 922 P.2dat574.
120. See id. at 193, 922 P.2d at 575.
121. Broome v. Byrd, 113 N.M. 38,41, 822 P.2d 677, 680 (Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added).
122. See Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 395, 399-400, 827 P.2d 102, 110, 114-15 (1992). The Saiz
court held the defendant landowner directly and strictly liable "for injuries caused by the absence of precautions
required in the face of peculiar risks of harm created ... in an area of public accommodation." Id. at 391, 827 P.2d
at 106. The landowner's liability for a breach of a nondelegable duty was direct, not vicarious. See id. at 396, 827 P.2d
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result of this nondelegable duty, the Saiz court held that an employer/landowner is
directly and strictly liable for the negligence of a hired contractor if the
employer/landowner did not take reasonable precautions against likely harm when
an inherent risk of danger is involved. 3 Now, with Otero, in 1996, the supreme
court has held that a landowner is vicariously liable," despite its earlier rejection of
"any coupling of the concept of vicarious liability and the nondelegable duty that
landowners have."' l
The supreme court's decision in Otero follows the New Mexico Court of Appeals'
earlier adoption in Broome of section 422(a) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and its holding that a landowner is vicariously liable for the negligence of an
independent contractor while the work is in progress. The supreme court's extension
in Otero of vicarious liability also is consistent with the understanding that the
numerous exceptions to the non-imposition of liability on landowners for torts of
their independent contractors make the imposition of liability likely to be applied in
most cases. However, the Otero court's extension of vicarious liability deviates from
the supreme court's 1992 decision in Saiz v. Belen School District,which held a
landowner directly and strictly liable under the section 41-3A-l (C)(4) public policy
exception of New Mexico's Several Liability Act.
B.

Liability, Indemnification, and ComparativeFault in Otero

1. Liability
In Otero, Jordan, the landowner/employer, "stood in the shoes" of Marquart, its
independent contractor, for the purpose of determining Jordan's liability to Otero, the
victim and plaintiff, "because of a policy-based decision that landowners should be
held responsible for unsafe conditions on their premises whether or not they directly
created them."' 6 Jordan was vicariously liable to Otero for Marquart's negligent
construction of Jordan's bleachers.'7 Implicit in the supreme court's decision is that
Jordan was jointly and severally liable with Marquart for Marquart's negligence
because of Jordan's special relationship to Marquart, pursuant to section 41-3A1(C)(2) of New Mexico's Several Liability Act."2a Thus, under an Otero analysis, a
landowner may anticipate being held vicariously liable for an independent

at 111. The Saiz court further stated: "we reject any coupling of the concept of vicarious liability and nondelegable
duty." / at 399, 827 P.2d at 114. This statement conflicts with the court of appeals' earlier findings in Broome that
a commercial landowner has a nondelegable duty to business invitees with respect to repairs and other work on the
landowner's premises, a duty which cannot be avoided by the hiring of an independent contractor, and that a
landowner is vicariously liable for the negligence of a contractor. See Broome, 113 N.M. at 40-41, 822 P.2d 679-80.
123. See Saiz, 113 N.M. at 395, 827 P.2d at 110; see also Ford v. Board of County Conun'rs, 118 N.M. 134,
139, 879 P.2d 766, 771 (1994).
124. See Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996).
125. Saiz, 113 N.M. at 399, 827 P.2d at 114.
126. Otero, 122 N.M. at 191, 922 P.2d at 573.
127. See id. at 193, 922 P.2d at 575.
128. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1996). Any person whose relationship to another would
make that person vicariously liable for the acts of the other shall be jointly and severally liable. See id. § 41-3A1(C)(2).
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contractor's tortious act rather than directly and strictly liable for29the failure to take
reasonable precautions to protect against harm on his premises.
2. Indemnification
In Otero, the City negligently failed to investigate Marquart's permit
application. 30 The City would have been entitled to indemnification from Marquart
had Otero chosen to sue the City and had the City been assigned a percentage of fault
3
based on its failure to investigate Marquart's application.' ' However, the
132 supreme
City.
the
indemnify
to
duty
no
had
have
would
court found that Jordan
The Otero court focused on Marquart's tacit and fraudulent representation to the
City that he had a valid commercial license when he applied for a permit to make
improvements on Jordan's restaurant. 3 Unlike Marquart, Jordan did not make an
3
intentional misrepresentation to Otero or to the City." Even if the City were held
partially liable, Jordan was only a concurrent tortfeasor with the City rather than an
intentional actor against the City.
Further, Jordan did not stand in Marquart's shoes to indemnify the City because
Jordan owed no duty to the City. Marquart's misrepresentation that he had a license
to perform commercial installations lay outside the scope of Jordan's duty. Jordan's
duty extended only to business invitees. 35 The court reasoned that any complaint that
the City, as a concurrent tortfeasor, might have for indemnification would have been
only between the City and Marquart.136 Thus, the Otero court found that Jordan
would not have been required to indemnify the City had Otero sued the City and
won.
3. Comparative Fault
Because Otero sued in tort, there was a ready mechanism by which to fairly
apportion the liability of the City with that of Marquart and Jordan jointly and
severally under the doctrine of comparative negligence. The supreme court would
ordinarily have remanded this case for a determination of whether the City had
breached its duty to investigate Marquart's permit application under principles of

129. This in contrast to the supreme court's decision in Saiz, under which the nondelegable landowner duty
would have given rise to joint and several liability under the section 41-3A-1(C)(4) public policy exception to several
liability of the New Mexico Several Liability Act, and not to vicarious liability under section 41-3A-1 (C)(2) of the
Act.
130. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 189, 922 P.2d at 571.
131. See id. at 192,922 P.2d at 574. The City would have been entitled to indemnification from Marquart for
any damages awarded to Otero against it because of Marquart's fraudulent permit application. See id.
132. See id. at 193,922 P.2d at 575.
133. See id. at 192, 922 P.2d at 574.
134. See id. at 191-92, 922 P.2d at 573-74. Of particular relevance to the court was Marquart's knowledge that
he did not have a license to perform non-residential installations when Marquart made his application to the City. See
id. at 192, 922 P.2d at 574.
135. See id. at 192-93, 922 P.2d at 574-75. Marquart, with his representation that he had a license to perform
commercial installations, "could not have been allowed to attribute blame for Otero's injuries to the City." Id. at 192,
922 P.2d at 574.
136. The Otero court found that any complaint for indemnification by reason of Marquart's fraud against the
City would be between the City and Marquart, not the City and Jordan. See id. at 193, 922 P.2d at 575.
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comparative fault.'37 The factfinder could have determined the extent to which the
City's alleged breach contributed to Otero's injuries. Then, the factfinder usually
would have apportioned liability for damages between Marquart and the City under
the doctrine of comparative fault.'38 It would have assigned Marquart's percentage
of fault to Jordan who was found vicariously liable.139
However, the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal of the comparative
fault jury instruction because Marquart was guilty of the intentional tort of
misrepresentation." ° As discussed earlier,'4 intentional wrongdoers cannot reduce
their liability by laying off fault on a negligent concurrent tortfeasor. Therefore,
Jordan was not allowed to compare Marquart's fault with that of the City." 2
Had the comparative fault jury instruction been given, Marquart could have
benefited from his misrepresentation to the City by decreasing his liability for
damages to Otero and his liability to indemnify Jordan by assigning some blame to
the City. Under a Saiz analysis, Jordan would have been directly liable for the failure
to take reasonable precautions under the section 43-3A-2(C)(4) public policy
exception to several liability of the New Mexico Several Liability Act. Thus, Jordan
would not have been entitled to indemnification from Marquart because his liability
would be for his own failure to fulfill his nondelegable landowner's duty rather than
vicariously for his contractor's negligence. Indeed, the Saiz court stated that
"[l]iability is based upon a showing of injury proximately caused by the absence of
the necessary precautions" by the landowner and that
"[w]hat the independent
' 43
contractor knew or should have known is not at issue.'
C. Summary
Strategically, Otero benefited from Marquart's intentional representation. Jordan
also gained an advantage from being held vicariously liable rather than directly liable,
because he then had a right to indemnification from Marquart. Unfortunately for
Jordan, Marquart's representation barred the jury instruction which would have
allowed the factfinder to compare the City's fault to Marquart's fault and thus to
Jordan's vicarious liability for Marquart's conduct. Had the factfinder calculated the
City's negligence into the award in this case, Otero would have borne the risk that
the City's assigned portion of the liability would be uncollectible because of the
City's possible immunity under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act.' 44 However, the
proposed jury instruction was refused because Marquart's "tacit representation" lay
at the root of the City's alleged negligence.' 45

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See id. at 192, 922 P.2d at 574.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 192-93, 922 P.2d at 574-75.
See discussion supra Part M.A.
See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1(C)(1) (Repl. Panp. 1996).
See Saiz v. Belen Sch. Dist., 113 N.M. 387, 399, 827 P.2d 102, 114 (1992).
See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-4-1 to 41-4-29 (Repl. Pamnp. 1996).
See Otero, 122 N.M. at 192-93, 922 P.2d at 574-75.
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VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE OTERO DECISION
Otero v. JordanEnterprisesinvolved a "legal triangle." Jordan, rather than Otero,
bore the burden of an insolvent or immune third party tortfeasor because Jordan was
held jointly and severally liable with Marquart. The City's alleged negligence was
never compared by the factfinder because Marquart's tacit representation barred
comparing the fault of concurrent tortfeasors.
After Otero, landowners will attempt to analogize their situation to Otero so that
they will be held vicariously liable, rather than directly liable, for the negligent
conduct of independent contractors who leave the premises unsafe after they have
completed their work.'" This is a logical extension of the court of appeal's earlier
adoption in Broome of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 422(a), which imposes
liability on landowners for negligent conditions on the land caused by independent
contractors while the contractors are still working on the land. It additionally is in
accord with the understanding that the numerosity of the exceptions to the general
rule of non-liability of landowners frustrates the application of the general rule.
As a result of the Otero decision, landowners may attempt to use Otero when they
are vicariously liable for negligent tortfeasors. This is because Otero: (1) enables the
defendant landowner to apply the comparative negligence doctrine; (2) extinguishes
the landowner's liability to indemnify concurrent tortfeasors; and (3) gives
landowner's a right of indemnification from tortfeasors for whom they are held
vicariously liable. Plaintiffs will analogize to Otero when a landowner is vicariously
liable for an intentional tortfeasor because doing so will bar the comparative
negligence doctrine when third party tortfeasors are involved.
Landowners may be barred from raising comparative fault as a defense when the
negligent individual for whom they are found vicariously liable also has committed
an intentional tort. Nonetheless, this may be less harsh than the supreme court's
previous holding in Saiz which would have held the landowner directly liable for the
landowner's failure to fulfill its nondelegable duty.
However, the Otero decision leaves unclear the relevance and applicability of the
Saiz doctrine of direct and strict liability for a landowner's failure to fulfill its
nondelegable duty. The Otero court did not mention Saiz. It chose instead to rely
implicitly on the court of appeals' earlier decision in Broome. 47 The New Mexico
supreme court may need to decide whether Saiz will survive Otero, and if so, how
Saiz and Otero should work together in future litigation.
After Otero, a landowner who is vicariously liable may only compare the fault of
concurrent tortfeasors to the same extent as his independent contractor can. A

146. In effect, the result in Otero follows the language of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS section 422(b)
(1965), although the supreme court did not expressly affirm the court of appeals' adoption of section 422(b) in the
court of appeals' decision in Otero. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 188, 922 P.2d at 570 (The supreme court stated that
questions regarding the adoption of section 422(b) were not before the court.); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 422(b) (1965); Otero v. Jordan Restaurant Enters., 119 N.M. 721, 723-24, 895 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App.
1995), rev'd on other grounds, 122 N.M. 187, 922 P.2d 569 (1996).
147. See Otero, 122 N.M. at 193, 922 P.2d at 575. "Jordan ha[d] a landowner's duty that impose[d] vicarious
liability to invitees injured by an unsafe condition on the premises." Id. The Otero court's failure to cite or discuss
Saiz echoes the Saiz court's failure to mention Broome.
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landowner cannot compare the fault of concurrent tortfeasors when the contractor
cannot compare fault due to the contractor's own intentional misconduct.'48
The Otero court's reasoning may apply to any vicarious liability and concurrent
negligence fact pattern. Once vicarious liability for an intentional tortfeasor is
established, a plaintiff may seek one hundred percent of the recovery from the
intentional tortfeasor and the person vicariously liable for the intentional tortfeasor,
without having to compare the fault of other negligent concurrent tortfeasors. It
appears that the vicariously liable landowner may have a separate claim for
indemnification from the tortfeasor for whose conduct she is held vicariously liable.
Moreover, the vicariously liable landowner will not owe a duty to indemnify
concurrent third party tortfeasors. As the Otero court noted, not all vicarious liability
fact patterns will bar the defense of comparative fault. The test is whether the
vicarious liability is predicated on intentional conduct.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Otero, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that a landowner was vicariously
liable rather than directly and strictly liable for injuries that occurred on its premises
and arose from the tortious conduct of an independent contractor. After Otero, a
vicariously liable landowner has a claim for indemnification from the hired
independent contractor under certain circumstances. Additionally, a vicariously liable
landowner is protected from having to indemnify concurrent tortfeasors. However,
when an independent contractor's tort is an intentional one, neither the contractor nor
the vicariously liable landowner can reduce her liability by comparing the fault of a
concurrent tortfeasor.
The Otero decision provides plaintiffs with a mechanism by which to avoid
comparing the fault of immune or insolvent negligent concurrent tortfeasors and,
potentially, to recover one hundred percent of their damages. At the same time it
protects defendants by holding defendant landowners vicariously liable rather than
directly liable. Thus, landowners are protected from indemnifying concurrent
tortfeasors when there is a ready mechanism by which to apportion liability under the
doctrine of comparative fault.
SUSAN HERRERA WIDNER

148. Again, intentional tortfeasors are barred from comparing the fault of concurrent negligent tortfeasors.

